INTRODUCTION
Gone is the superpower rivalry of the Cold War era and the strategic significance it lent to the Middle East. The end of Soviet support has caused several Arab governments to realign their foreign policies; Israel is no longer necessarily perceived as an enemy but in some circles is seen as a potential economic and political partner. 1 Clearly a major motivation for expanding defence expenditures has therefore been eliminated. Even so, there are still gaps in the defence systems of most states in the region, and most countries wish to modernize their armed forces. Even the peace process will not stand in the way of modernization, and actual defence spending is not expected to fall significantly for some time. 2 It is commonly believed that the major constraint on new defence spending is the poor performance of regional economies and the strain on government budgets of maintaining a system of subsidies and social welfare. It follows that the pace of arms transfers may slow down as a result of the need to conserve resources, but the region is certain to continue spending heavily on security, even if the future enemy is more likely to be an Islamist than an Israeli. 3 While not disputing that view, this chapter takes another approach. Specifically it examines whether and to what extent the eastern Mediterranean states and Saudi Arabia have become so accustomed to defence expenditures that a reduction in their levels or rates of growth might actually result in economic disruption. Clearly if large segments of the economy are adversely affected by reduced allocations to the military, there will be some limits to the extent to which military cutbacks occur. Whether or not the reluctance to make further cuts in defence expenditures will derail 100
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the peace process is problematic, but there is no doubt that this phenomenon may hamper both economic and political progress.
LITERATURE SURVEY: THE IMPACT OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURES
A body of conventional wisdom has amassed over the years concerning the causes and consequences of Third World militarization. More often than not in the academic literature this wisdom has been anecdotal and biased towards the standard "guns or butter" metaphor. Since the modem defence establishment is a heavy consumer of technical and managerial manpower and foreign exchange, resources that are especially scarce in the Third World, the conventional argument is that increased defence burdens should reduce the overall rate of growth. 4 To test this theory, a rapidly growing body of empirical research has attempted to identify the impact of defence spending on various aspects of economic development and growth. Numerous studies have grown out of the debate but, unfortunately, no consensus has emerged. In the original study, Benoit 5 found strong evidence to suggest that defence spending encouraged the growth of civilian output per capita in less-developed countries.
This research has gone through various stages and levels of sophistication, with the initial studies largely based on ordinary least-squares regression techniques using Benoit's data-set for the 1950-65 period. The original research analysing Benoit's data-set 6 grouped countries on the basis of discriminant analysis with savings and investment used as variables. It was found that countries with relatively high levels of savings and investment experienced positive impacts on growth, while the impact was statistically insignificant for countries experiencing low levels of savings and investment.
On the other hand, Rothschild 7 concluded that increased military expenditures lowered economic growth by reducing exports in 14 OECD countries during the period 1956-69. In his examination of 54 developing countries for the sample period 1965-73, Lim 8 found defence spending to be detrimental to economic growth. Deger and Sen, 9 Leontief and Duchin, 10 Faini, Annez and Taylor, 11 Biswas and Ram, 12 and Grobar and Porter 13 also found evidence refuting the claim that defence spending stimulates economic growth.
In contrast, Wolfs 14 research examining the economic impact of Third World military expenditures utilising various sub-groupings of countries tended to contradict these findings. Much of this research implicitly argues that, in certain economic situations, by creating a stable environment it is possible that added defence expenditures may stimulate higher rates of investment, technological progress, technology transfer and hence increased overall growth.
Frederiksen and myself 15 also used Benoit's sample countries. However, our study grouped countries largely on the basis of foreign exchange earnings, import elasticity and productivity of investment. Again, relatively unconstrained countries experienced positive impacts on growth stemming from defence expenditures, while the countries that were relatively constrained in terms of foreign exchange showed a statistically insignificant but negative impact. Using a later time period, 1965-73, and again grouping developing countries on the basis of their relative savings and investment, 16 we found that the relatively unconstrained countries enjoyed a positive impact from defence expenditures.
These initial studies examined only the impact of defence expenditures on growth. More recent analysis in the area has been more sophisticated, employing more elaborate statistical devices and/or more subtle country groupings. For example, Third World military producers 17 during the period 1970-82 experienced positive impacts from military expenditures on growth, investment and savings, but declines in productivity. 18 Non-producers experienced declines in growth and investment. In recent years, analysis has branched into more complex issues, and utilized both time-series 19 and simultaneous-equation models estimated by two and three-stage leastsquares regression techniques. These studies introduced the demand for military expenditures into the analysis to allow for feedback from the macroeconomy to defence. 20 Interestingly, the results 21 produced by these techniques tended to confirm the results obtained from the simpler, more naive models.
In short, the existing body of research demonstrates a consistent pattern whereby certain groups of Third World countries -usually the more successful economically, the more stable politically, or those engaged in military production 22 -derive positive impacts on investment and growth from military spending. Those countries less successful economically, more politically unstable or lacking a domestic arms industry fail to derive any positive economic impacts from defence expenditures.
Some studies have also identified a number of adverse effects that stem from defence expenditures which come at the expense of other forms of national expenditure. Such effects obtain even in those countries experiencing higher overall rates of growth from increased allocations to defence. In particular, countries with an indigenous arms industry may suffer a deterioration in the distribution of income from added defence expenditures. The same may also occur in military regimes as the authorities shift income from urban consumers to industrial groups. 23 A major limitation of these studies is that, by their nature, cross-sectional studies are very aggregative, such that applying them to specific countries is hazardous at best.
Obvio'usly they are also incapable of capturing the dynamics associated with time. 24 Lebovic and Ishaq's 25 study of defence spending in the Middle
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East attempts to overcome these deficiencies. Using a pooled time-series, cross-sectional analysis on various groupings of Middle Eastern states, they found that higher military spending tended to suppress economic growth in the non-oil states of the Middle East during the 1973-84 period. However, while Lebovic and Ishaq drew on time-series data, they were not able to incorporate the potential effects of lags between the time defence expenditures occur, and the period of maximum economic impact.
In this regard, Babin 26 has noted that incorporating the time variable into the analysis can be critical because some relationships that may exist over time disappear in the short run and vice versa. This implies that, at the national level, development usually requires a series of changes that occur through systems, which involve organizations, agencies, economic structures and technological variables. Consequently, as Babin concludes, it unjustifiable to assume that a country's defence spending will have an immediate, or even short-term, effect on national economic performance. Babin's main finding was that while short-run economic impacts of defence expenditure may be nil or even negative, the longer-term effect on growth is likely to be positive.
Along these lines, Kick and Sharda's 27 analysis suggests that an increase in the military manpower tatio has a significant positive effect on infrastructure and social welfare. This impact occurs with a long (12-year) time lag. Kick and Sharda also found that the relationship over a 12-year period is positive. Militarization, whether measured by expenditures or size of the military, does contribute to development. · Finally, recent work at the International Monetary Fund 28 suggests positive gains from reduced allocations to the military. The most recent of these studies 29 identified a substantial long-run "peace dividend" in the form of higher capacity output. This, in turn, may result from: (1) markedly lower military expenditure levels achieved in most regions during the late 1980s; and (2) further military spending cuts that might become possible in the future if global peace is sustained and deepened over time.
THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION
Nearly all of these studies have implicitly assumed a pattern of causation: defence expenditures are either politically and/or strategically driven and hence exogenous; or, instead, allocations to the military may simply reflect the underlying resource base (the ability to finance) and are hence endogenous. This .is an important point, since many of the contradictory findings on militaries' economic impacts stem from differences in model construction, while the act of model construction in itself implicitly assumes that defence expenditures are either endogenous or exogenous.
It follows that before drawing any definitive conclusions as to the impact of defence expenditures, one must satisfactorily address the issue of causation. Fortunately several statistical tests are gaining wider acceptance for this purpose. To date, the original and most widely used causality test is one developed by Granger. 30 The Granger Test
Granger defines causality such that X causes (G-C) Y if Y can be predicted more accurately in the sense of mean-square error, with the use of past values of X than without using past X. Based upon the definition of Granger causality, a simply bivariate autoregressive model for defence and gross domestic product (GDP) can be specified as follows:
where DEF = defence expenditures; p, q, rands are lag lengths for each variable in the equation; and u and v are serially uncorrelated white-noise residuals. By assuming that error terms (u, v) are "nice", ordinary leastsquares (OLS) becomes the appropriate estimation method. 31 Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint F-test is appropriate for causal detection:
F = RSS(r)-RSS(u) I (df(r)-df(u))

RSS(u) I df(u)
where RSS(r) and RSS(u) are the residual sum of squares of restricted and unrestricted models, respectively; and df(r) and df(u) are, respectively, the degrees of freedom in restricted and unrestricted models.
The Granger test detects causal directions in the following manner: first, unidirectional causality from DEF to GDP if the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that past values of DEF in equation (6.1) are insignificantly different from zero, and if the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that past values of GDP in equation (6.2) are insignificantly different from zero. That is, DEF causes GDP, but GDP does not cause DEF. Unidirectional causality runs from GDP to DEF if the reverse is true. Second, bidirectional causality runs between DEF and GDP if both F-test statistics reject the null hypotheses in equations (6.1) and (6.2). Finally, no causality exists between DEF and GDP if we cannot reject both null hypotheses at the conventional significance level.
. Joerding 32 has tested the defence-growth hypothesis using Granger causality methods. That is, he tested for the assumed exogeneity of defence budgets. Using a pooled sample containing 15 observations from each of 57 countries, Joerding employed a multivariate model which also included investment and government spending and concluded that defence expenditures are not strongly exogenous and that previous studies were flawed. While Joerding's work provides insight into the nature of the relationship between defence and growth, there are three issues that merit further attention, as suggested by LaCivita and Frederiksen. 33 First, Joerding lumps all countries into one sample. This suggests a commonality of causal relationships across diverse economic environments. As Frederiksen and myself have demonstrated, splitting a pooled sample into separate groups (in their case based on the level of relative resource constraints) can lead to quite different results. 34 Second, by aggregating the sample, Joerding assumed a common lag structure for all of the countries in the sample (in his study, four years on the defence and growth variables). It seems reasonable to hypothesize that if a causal relationship does exist (either defence to growth or growth to defence) one could expect the time lags to differ from country to country. And finally, Joerging's method for choosing lag length was ad hoc.
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of lag length. 35 If the chosen length is less than the true lag length, the omission of relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is greater than the true lag length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes estimates to be inefficient. While Joerding chose his lag lengths based on preliminary partial autocorrelation methods, there is no a priori reason to assume lag lengths equal for all of our sample countries. For example, in a study of the Philippines, Frederiksen and LaCivita 36 found no statistical relationship between growth and defence when both variables had a lag equal to four. With a lag length of two periods, however, growth caused defence. Since both lag lengths are arbitrary, one cannot form an objective conclusion as to the direction of causation.
The Hsaio Procedure
To overcome such difficulties noted above, Hsaio 37 developed a systematic method for assigning lags. This method combines Granger causality and Akaike's final prediction error (FPE), the (asymptotic) mean-square prediction error, to determine the optimum lag for each variable. In an article examining the problems encountered in choosing lag lengths, Thornton and Batten 38 found Hsaio's method to be superior to both arbitrary lag length selection and several other systematic procedures for determining lag length.
The first step in Hsaio's procedure is to perform a series of autoregressive regressions on the dependent ...ariable. In the first regression, the dependent 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction error for each regression as:
we choose the optimal lag length for D, n* as the lag length which produces the lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to determine lag length is equivalent to using a series of F-tests with variable levels of significance. 39 The first term measures the estimation error and the second term measures the modelling error. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality property40 that "balances the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected and the risk due to increases in the variance when a higher order is selected." As noted by Judge et al., 41 an intuitive reason for using the FPE criterion is that longer lags increase the first term but decrease the RSS of the second term, and thus the two opposing forces are optimally balanced when their product reaches its minimum.
Depending on the value of the final prediction errors, four cases are possible:
(1) Defence causes growth. This occurs when the prediction error for growth falls when the equation includes defence. In addition, when growth is a~ded to the defence equatiot'l, the final prediction error increases;
. This occurs when the final prediction error decreases when defence is added to the growth equation, and the final prediction error decreases when growth is added to the defence equation; or (4) No relationship. This occurs when the final prediction error increases when defence is added to the growth equation, and also increases when growth is added to the defence equation.
METHODOLOGY42
Several conceptual problems remain. Most economic time-series are nonstationary. Stationarity is an important property as it guarantees that there are no fundamental changes in the structure of the process that would render prediction difficult or impossible. To overcome this problem, I have used the rates of growth of each variable in the estimated equations. 43 Regressing these transformed series on a constant and time produced coefficients that were different from zero for all countries. Similar regressions of the untransformed levels indicated the presence of a trend. The region's recent defence expenditures show great diversity (see Table  6 .1) with few generalizations possible. Clearly, progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process has yet to be reflected in the region's attitude towards defence issues. 44 In many countries weapons systems are being upgraded and expanded, and gaps in national defences are being filled with new acquisitions. Across the Middle East, defence budgets account for anything from 3.3 per cent to 14 per cent of GDP: the European average is 1.85 per cent of GDP.
Of course one must be wary of over-generalizing. Israel's economy is fundamentally different from those of other countries in the region; it is more akin to some of the European economies. Within the Arab Middle East there are important differences between the major oil-exporting countries and those with far less or no oil, and there are also important country differences aside from oil. 45 In the sections below, the analysis has been confined to the economies of Israel Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, where, as Eliyahu Kanovsky notes, the relationship between economic stagnation and other socio-economic ills, along with the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, together constitute a grave threat to the longer-term durability of ArabIsraeli peace agreements. 46 
RESULTS
The results show great diversity across the sample of countries. In fact, no one pattern dominates the findings, suggesting that generalizations about the economic motivations for increasing or decreasing defence expenditures are of little value. The alleged peace dividend may be high for the region as a whole, but for several individual countries it is problematic that a reduction in defence expenditures would provide a major boom to their economies.
Israel
The patterns for Israel are particularly interesting and in many respects are more complex than for the other countries examined. The dominant pattern is one of feedback, whereby increases in defence expenditures impact positively on the economy (equation 1, Table 6 .2). In turn, economic growth tends to generate additional resources to allow a further expansion in defence. The same pattern also holds for the defence burden (equation 2, Table 6 .2). That is, an increase in the growth of the share of defence in GNP tends to increase the subsequent rate of growth in GDP. Here however the link between increased defence burdens and GDP is considerably weaker than the simple Defence ~ GDP linkages. This pattern seems to hold mainly when defence is not increasing its budgetary share (more specifically the growth in defence share of the budget). When this occurs (Equation 3, Table  6 .2) there is a weak reduction in the growth of GDP. Finally, a particularly strong linkage occurs between increases in armed forces (per 1000 population) and GDP. Here, increases in the growth of the armed forces exert a strong (Equation 4, Table 6 .2) stimulus to GDP. This stimulus occurs quickly, with the optimal lag around one year. These findings suggest that defence expenditures in Israel have acted as a positive stimulus to overall economic expansion, but the precise nature of these links is unclear. However, it appears that the government has little incentive from a purely economic point of view in reducing defence expenditure. Presumably the reduction in defence expenditures would have to be replaced by some other type of expenditure to avoid increased unemployment and a slowdown in economic activity.
The ability of defence expenditures to stimulate the economy is consistent with a model of foreign aid recently developed by McGuire, 47 in which foreign aid creates several price and income movements in the recipient country. For Israel, aid from the United States has created an indirect stimulus to investment via the complementarity between investment and defence. In addition, the aid provides significant resources via tax relief to the private sector. Subsequently these resources flow into capital formation: "It appears in summary, that a significant fraction of United States aid goes to support capital formation in Israel via this diversion of resources." 48 In short, United States military grants to Israel have not only allowed the country to increase military expenditures rapidly in the short run, but, perhaps more importantly, to increase them in a way not detrimental to investment and economic growth.
Jordan
In contrast to Israel, Jordanian defence expenditures have tended to respond to an expanding resource ba;e; that is, they have been passive in that they Note: Summary of results obtained from Granger causality tests using a Hsaio procedure to determine the optimal lag; i.e., a four-year lag indicates that most of the impact from the expenditures or GDP in any one year tends to be distributed over four successive years.
..... 
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have tended to respond to underlying economic trends rather than initiating or modifying those trends. On an overall basis, increases in the armed forces have had a fairly negative impact on GDP. While one could only speculate as to the cause of this pattern, the lost output stemming from shifting workers from civilian to military activities would seem to be a logical place to start. However, it is clear that the country could significantly reduce its allocations to defence without incurring the risk of deflation. Conceivably in Jordan's case the major problems associated with a lasting Middle East peace agreement would be what to do with the resources that do not have to be earmarked for defence. In a recent assessment of the Jordanian economy the World Bank argued that in the short run, while peace may offer Jordan some immediate benefits arising primarily from an investment-led boom in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it also carries substantial risks to macroeconomic stability. 49 The real question then is whether the country has the capacity to manage these increased risks through improved macroeconomic management and further efforts to strengthen the financial system.
Syria
In contrast to the patterns found in Israel and Jordan, defence expenditures have had a generally negative, albeit weak impact on the Syrian economy.
On the one hand, this impact has tended to be short, averaging one year, but it is consistent across defence expenditures, the defence burden and the share of defence in the central government budget. On the other hand, the increased economic growth appears to provide additional resources to expand the armed forces.
Egypt
The dominant pattern in Egypt (Table 6. 3) over this period is one of no statistically significant links between defence expenditures and the overall economy. It appears that increased defence expenditures tend to produce a stimulus for increased capital formation, but these linkages are weak. The ensuing link between investment and GDP is rather strong, making the overall impact of defence expenditures difficult to assess.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabian patterns (Table 6 .4) are more complex in that it is necessary to distinguish between total GDP and that of non-oil GDP. Given its high oil component, it is safe to assume that GDP could be affected by defence only under highly unusual circumstances. Therefore, it makes sense to test the impact defence may have had on the non-oil component of GDP. That is, did Robert E. Looney 113 defence create linkages with the local economy or was it in competition with the private sector for resources? The results are as follows. As anticipated, causation is largely from GDP to defence; that is, an increased resource base is used to fund additional allocations to the military. The impact here is quick, but not necessarily strong (Equations 1 and 2, Table 6 .4). This may be due in part to the volatility of oil revenues and the stability in defence procurement contracts, once signed. That is, during periods of high oil revenues, contracts may be let that require expenditures over multiple years. Fluctuations in oil revenues would then mask this underlying linkage.
For non-oil revenues the pattern is largely one of defence expenditures providing a mild stimulus to the economy. Again, this stimulus occurs fairly quickly with an average lag of about two years. In the Saudi Arabian case the impact of private investment and government investment on GDP were also examined. Here it was found that private investment had a strong impact on non-oil GDP, with public investment a much weaker linkage. Of the three, defence expenditures were stronger than government investment as a stimulus to the domestic economy, but weaker than private investment.
While the actual Saudi Arabian defence expenditures appear to be linked to oil revenues and can be expected to decline, the country does appear to derive some domestic benefits from increased allocations to the military. Whether these are linkages with the country's offset programme are unclear. The fact is, these linkages appear stronger than they would be with government investment, for instance. Clearly the main problem for the Saudis will entail finding ways to replace defence expenditures (which are not likely to increase due to budgetary constraints) with other types of expenditures, such as private investment. This is a goal of both the current and the prior development plans. However, given the low productivity of capital investment, the country would apparently gain little from diverting expenditures from the military to further expansion in infrastructure.
CONCLUSION
These results suggest the difficulties in generalizing over possible peace dividends or even the willingness of countries to reduce defence expenditures as part of a Middle East peace process. Israel and Saudi Arabia probably have the least to gain from reduced defence expenditures; they were the only countries to experience a consistently positive linkage from defence to GDP, although the Saudi links are from defence to non-oil GDP. Egypt does not appear to gain any direct growth benefits from defence expenditures; however, there is some evidence that increased defence may stimulate capital investment. That country might benefit from a more detailed analysis to discern the nature of this linkage and whether or not other types of government expenditure might provide a stimulus of the same order of magnitude. Jordan would be the next 'most likely country to gain from reduced defence expenditures. As noted, this effect would not be a true peace dividend, since defence expenditures do not impact negatively on the economy. However, it is clear that Jordanians have many opportunities to productively use the resources that might have ordinarily gone to the military. Syria appears to be the country with the greatest economic stake in a lasting Middle East peace. Syria was the one country that derived negative impacts on economic growth from defence expenditures, and as a result it is the only candidate for a true peace dividend.
In general, these findings support Kanovsky's contentions 50 that (1) there is very little likelihood of any further significant reductions in regional military expenditures; and (2) that even if such reductions were to take place, there are many other impediments to economic growth in the Arab Middle East: in particular, adverse economic policies and poor political processes. His feeling is that peace agreements, however desirable in their own right, will not solve the basic economic problems of these countries. Only farreaching changes in economic policy can extricate them from stagnation, unemployment and underemployment, debilitating poverty and a widening and dangerous gap between the few rich and the many poor.
APPENDIX: TESTING FOR UNIT ROOTS AND CO-INTEGRATION
As noted above, the time series must be stationary to yield valid Granger tests. 51 In this regard the finding of a unit root in a time series indicates non-stationarity.
In a well-known paper, Dickey and Fuller 52 suggested a method for computing a test for a unit root in a time series, and presented critical values for their proposed tests with and without the trend variable included. Dickey-Fuller tests were performed using PCGive Version 7. In a simple case where: xt = a + bxt -1 + el where b = l, which generates a random walk (with drift if a not equal to 0).
Here, the autoregressive coefficient is unitary and stationarity is violated. A process with no unit or explosive roots is said to be /(O); a process is /(d) if it needs to be differenced d times to become /(0). The Durbin-Watson statistic (DW)for the level of a variable offers one simple characterization of this integrated property. For example, if xt is a random walk, DW will be very small. If" is white noise, DW will be around 2. Very low DW values thus indicate that a transformed model may be desirable, perhaps including a mixture of differenced and disequilibrium variables.
The tests 53 consisted of first performing the Dickey-Fuller procedure on the logs of all variables: Here, the t-test on the lagged value is the relevant statistic, with critical values provided in MacKinnon, 54 and Davidson and MacKinnon 55 • As noted above, these tests indicated non-stationarity. Next, tests were performed on the first differences of the log values. In all cases these were significant at the 95 per cent level (and often at the 99 per cent level).
Notes
